Tag: India

The African Union in the G20 is a Good Omen for the Global South

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By Moshi Israel

During the recently concluded G20 summit, the African Union (AU) earned permanent member status among the world’s top 20 economies. For the hosts, India or Bharat, and even more specifically, Prime Minister Nerandra Modi, the acceptance of the AU into the G20 is symbolic of his continuous fight to give a voice to the global south in an international system increasingly dominated by great power politics.

This decision has been long overdue given the enormous size of the African continent and the diversity of people and economies it represents. Combined, African countries are as good as any other, and perhaps a future ambition for the AU should be the integration of all the region’s economies into one with a common trade policy. This would prove instrumental in dealing with countries that created the current international trade system and constantly break the rules that limit their ambitions. The AU’s elevation to permanent member status just like the European Union is a chance for countries at the periphery of international relations to be represented in the group.

The presence of the African Union as a permanent member in the G20 also serves to extend the often-elusive microphone to the bloc. For so long, African countries have had to stand outside the halls of power as others debated problems and deliberated solutions concerning the continent. Many of the region’s leaders tuned in to cable television to receive breaking news about what the major powers had decided would be Africa’s future. Moreover, the African continent has no control over the narratives concerning its past. This opportunity is, therefore, a significant step for developing countries in Africa to represent themselves and offer up ideas that align with the African context. The AU right now has a podium to prove naysayers wrong.

India is following in the footsteps of its BRICS partners, China and Russia in championing the platforming of the global south on the international stage. In this aspect, China has been ahead of the curve and has behaved in a foresighted manner. Indeed, for long, China and entire BRICS family have for long shown their support for Africa to be admitted into the grouping as a Permanent member. Foresight often eludes most great powers. The west seems to be playing catch up when it comes to updating and revising relations with the global south.

The current global order is in crisis and many international state actors are turning to the global south as the foundation for a new more inclusive and equitable global order. The addition of the AU as a permanent member into the G0 ranks is yet another step in the direction of achieving a truly multipolar world.

The crises facing the world today range from the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine war, and climate change to food insecurity and inflation. Fittingly, the summit in India had an agenda that focused on the issues affecting developing countries the most. Some of these issues include; finding alternatives to fossil fuels, food security, a common framework for digital public infrastructure, and resource efficiency. Reforming the major mainstream lending institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was also key on the agenda. This would help developing countries have quick access to development-related funds. Moreover, the growing popularity and strength of the BRICS bank should be a signal to the World Bank and IMF that change is inevitable and reform is a necessity.

The AU will be a key figure in the global fight against climate change. Its permanent presence in the G20 will help to expand the voice of the global south, especially on issues of climate financing and a just transition to the green economy.

The growing relevance of the global south in the international arena should not be underestimated. Countries like China have picked up on this trajectory and invested heavily in developing countries all around the world. The goal is to obtain a mutually beneficial partnership through south-south cooperation.

The West has largely treated the global south as its backyard and often dealt with it through handouts and dictates. Blocs like BRICS helped change this narrative and engaged the global south on equal terms. And now, the G20 has also awakened to the reality that the world’s nations need each other and the global south has a vital role to play. For instance, the conflict in Ukraine and the subsequently failed sanctions on Russia have shown that having the global south on your side is important and necessary for key geopolitical maneuvers.

Additionally, as part of the G20, the AU should seek to lead Africa on a new path that is strategically beneficial for all its members. The first step in this process is to get rid of the destructive colonial mindset that has held the AU members back.

The Writer is a Research Fellow with Development Watch Center.

 

 

 

BRICS STRUCTURE TO DEVELOPMENT MORE RELEVANT TO AFRICA

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By Balongoofu Daniel

The steady traction of the emergence of the BRICS in the contemporary global order reflects a potential shift of the global governance structure to a more economic led mechanism of cooperation through trade and the formulation of coordinated political positions on global issues to secure and under guard a collective path to economic development. The BRICS, a bloc that represents emerging economies; Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa have gained much traction in the international arena due to their firm positions and structures of engagement specifically favorable for south-south relations, a structure that the global south has upheld to achieving economic development.

This year’s BRICS summit currently underway in south Africa is one of the most followed and widely anticipated political engagements globally due to the blocs’ spread popularity and attraction of interest from over 40 states including the UAE, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia among others.  The state of turbulence in global governance characterised with war, economic recession and post -pandemic recovery have made this 15th summit a much anticipated one on forging a way through for development. However, I find the bloc’s structure to development a more relevant reality to Africa and the global south as follows,

In this year’s summit’s special mug, a compilation by the south African government highlights the blocs’ special achievements, challenges and way forward in south Africa’s context thus far seeks to  highlight the beauty and advantages of the adopted strategy for BRICS economic partnership that looks forward to increasing access to each other’s markets, promote mutual trade and investments and creating a business friendly environment for investors in all BRICS countries. The authorities in south Africa further highlight that the most important part of this strategy is to diversify the trading of finished products as opposed to raw materials, a strategy that Uganda, Africa and the global south needs to broadly adopt in order to realize home production and control trade deficits.in the same vein, south Africa notes that its exports share to the BRICS countries have recorded strong growth since 2016 and registered a 7.1% per annum on average reaching US 817.6 billion in 2022. The mug further highlights that the principal contributor to such growth was exports to china over the same period.

In light with the AFCTFTA, an economic initiative by the African union that seeks to achieve a liberalised African continental market and to address the challenges of Africa’s low level of participation in the global economy and world trade, the south African authorities highlighted the importance of merging markets and the building of more partnerships with the BRICS under such an initiative. This will not only unlock trade possibilities but also mutually beneficial opportunities for investment and infra structural development. This further underscores a much broader market and   more liberalism in trade and also promote self-reliance through encouraging industrialisation for production. It should be noted that BRICS brings together a 3.27 billion population of people that makes the question of market and diversity a more achievable reality necessary for production.

The relevancy of the New Development Bank (NDB) that the cooperation achieved through availing of funds for development seeks to solve the global south long unanswered question of funding. It should be noted that the bank has catalyses availability of funds for development that so far US$ 32.8 billion worth of developmental projects have been funded using this bank availed financial resources. So far, the funds have been invested in building and upgrading of 820 bridges, building and upgrading of 35000 housing units and the generation of 2800mw of renewable and clean energy. This therefore is a blessing and an alternative source of funding from the IMF and world bank that the global south has arguably criticised for politicising funding and unfair repay policies.

Balongoofu Daniel is a Junior Research Fellow at Sino-Uganda Research Centre

 

BRICS should focus on big issues to build ideal world

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The highly anticipated meeting between president of China Xi Jinping and the Russian President Vladmir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Summit (SCO) took place in Uzbekistan on the backdrop of deteriorating relations between the two leaders and the collective west. President Xi and Putin generally showed support for each other and encouraged further cooperation in trade. Moscow is very much in need of a new market for its energy and China welcomes the opportunity to acquire cheap gas. An oil and gas pipeline deal were discussed between Russia, China and Mongolia and it is supported by the president of Mongolia.  Important on the agenda were security concerns for the two nations and their allies. President Putin was more interested in addressing what he considers the unwarranted dominance of the collective west in the international arena and it is no surprise that he is actively seeking for challengers to the status quo.

This meeting, however, is especially vital for a whole other reason since three of the five core members of BRICS were present. It is significant for the future of BRICS, a coalition of five states, namely; Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. In the last BRICS summit hosted virtually by China, BRICS members committed to expanding the bloc and being more inclusive. Notably, countries like Iran, Argentina and other African nations signaled interest to join the bloc. At the moment the future of the bloc seems assertive enough to challenge the dominance of the western coalition led by the United States in global politics. BRICS members have wide and ambitious objectives that surmise into restructuring the current global political and economic order. However, the vital task at hand is that the bloc should not morph into a mere anti-western hegemony coalition and according to the stated objectives of BRICS, the alliance is well poised to aim beyond that.

Therefore, the expansion of BRICS should be strategically based on a careful review of a potential member’s profile. Being hostile to western hegemony should never become the only qualifying quality for any potential member. It is a fact that unilateral decisions by USA with the often-expected assistance from her allies have caused havoc and crippled entire regions, from the Middle East, Eentral and Southern America, Eastern Europe to Northern and sub-Saharan Africa.

These unilateral and sometimes short-sighted actions have earned the United States a fair number of aggrieved enemies seeking to settle scores and they might view BRICS as a stepping stone to that goal. However, this fact may render BRICS a home to less-than-ideal candidates that may not have the long-term interests of the bloc in mind. Neutral states like India are a necessary ingredient for the bloc long-term even though they might seem like a risky partner in the coalition. This is due to India’s close partnership with the collective west.  However, the risk that India poses to the bloc does not lie in her close partnership with the west but in her belligerent and rocky relationship with China. And this relationship is an important chapter in the bloc’s evolution story.

Though leaders of China and India have proven their capacity to address grievances of the two by meeting and talking, a lasting solution to issues of each side’s concern is much needed and will boast the cooperation and trust of the two largest members of the BRICS. Once such differences are sorted, which is not an easy task but it is one task that must be accomplished, then the bloc will have skipped a major hurdle that stifles many promising partnerships in their infancy.

BRICS should make as priority the political and social integration of all its members, moving past the limiting economic partnerships if it is to challenge the west in any meaningful manner. It takes one look across the aisle to notice that most countries in the western coalition, share almost similar socio-political and economic values despites being geographically and ethnically diverse. Avoiding the trap of being merely anti-west is important because, some western allies can be lured into joining the bloc if the latter has a recognizable and meaningful positive impact on global politics. A meaningful impact on the world ranges from having a comprehensive global security framework that ensures world peace, an economic system that is balanced and beneficial to all encompassing detailed and practical solutions to protecting the environment and tackling the crisis of climate change.

Many challenges lie ahead for BRICS in different pockets of the world and members of BRICS+ will need institutions both financial and political to guide in the implementation of the bloc’s policy goals and objectives. This must be done with expected resistance form the western coalition and her institutions. Observing current statements and ambitions of BRICS member states, it is quite clear that in the long-run the bloc must create a separate financial system form the current western one and this involves convincing potential members and the rest of the world that the BRICS alternative is much better. New Development Bank (BRICS bank) can help in selling this agenda by offering financial assistance to different sectors than its current focus of infrastructure and energy.

This is where developing countries in Africa, South America and Asia can play an important role. China has already made significant in-roads on the African continent economically, Russia is making in-roads militarily in places like Mali, Sudan, Central African Republic and in other west African countries.

One key recipe missing is media presence to foster people-to people diplomacy and strengthen cultural ties, an area where the west has excelled. The west has managed to endear herself to Africa despite all their past atrocities on the continent during and after colonialism. The west has achieved this by opening up opportunities within western borders for talented and ambitious individuals from the African continent and overtime this number of western educated and influenced Africans has significantly increased.

When it comes to presence of media from BRICS member states on the continent, there is no competition because the west dominates this area. Though gaining, still China’s CGTN is yet to be felt on ground. For Russia’s RT, arguably, very few know it exist. Advanced Television.com found that in 2020, BBC news in Africa increased its reach to 132 million people a week.

BRICS alliance mechanism aims to promote peace, security, development and cooperation and the surest way to this is through adopting new, unique and innovative approaches to developing alliances and solving problems around the world. This to be felt on ground, as a group or individual member countries, BRICS must invest more in media and sell their ideas of their ideal world they aspire to bring.

BRICS still has an open advantage to expand strategically and create a whole different world, it is made up of emerging economies, a trait that gives its founding members relatability to other developing nations. The alliance, accounts for over 3 billion people which is over 40% of the world’s population and just over a quarter of the global GDP. Therefore, on face value, the alliance has immense potential and this potential has to be realized through strategic expansion. Most importantly, this expansion should not be solely fueled by grievances against the collective west but by a genuine concern for global affairs and a resolute desire to challenge and change the status quo.

By Moshi Israel.

The Writer is a Research Fellow at Development Watch Centre

Covid vaccines: Russia, China, India…Who is supplying Africa?

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By Marie Toulemonde, The Africa Report. 

Covid vaccination campaigns have kicked off across the globe. But while many developed countries are busy inoculating their populations, the continent is grappling with growing bilateral agreements with foreign laboratories and mobilising its health professionals.

Western countries, perhaps hit harder by the virus, but above all richer, are creating a traffic jam by securing, like Canada, enough vaccines for up to three times their population.

In Africa, deliveries of the vaccines promised by the COVAX aid programme for developing countries are still behind. Faced with the urgent need to contain a second wave that is much more virulent than the first, notably with the South African variant, the AU is releasing funds and some countries are negotiating directly with foreign laboratories.

Vaccine diplomacy

At the end of December, the NGO Oxfam estimated that 70 poor countries would only be able to vaccinate one in ten inhabitants in 2021. Under these circumstances, China and Russia have once again shown themselves to be particularly attentive to the continent’s needs. As early as June, China’s number one, Xi Jinping, expressed his “generosity” at the China-Africa summit by promising African countries that they would benefit from advantageous conditions during the massive distribution of Chinese vaccines.

Unlike Pfizer-BioNTech or Moderna, China and Russia pride themselves on having developed vaccines that are accessible, can be stored in the refrigerator (making them easier to send and store in poorer regions) and, above all, are available.

The majority of the Maghreb countries, due to these numerous advantages, have already ordered several million doses. But concerns about the real effectiveness of Chinese vaccines are growing and Russian deliveries are slow. AstraZeneca’s vaccine, produced by the Indian laboratory Serum Institute of India, is also planning to supply 200 million doses as part of the Covax.

 

  Countries that have signed bilateral agreements with Laboratories. Map by The Africa Report.

Source: By The Africa Report

 

Revelations and Opportunities: What the United States Can Learn From The Sino-Indian Crisis.

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By Sameer Lalwani.

Strategists of governance, economics, and geopolitics have long known that a crisis is a terrible thing to waste. The Sino-Indian border crisis, which now seems under control, is no different.

Scuffles in mid-May between Chinese and Indian troops appeared to escalate with People’s Liberation Army actions of unprecedented breadth, size, and coordination across multiple fronts. Though the Indian government sought to keep a lid on the story, reports showed signs of reinforcement and military buildup along the Line of Actual Control, the disputed border between the two countries. Soon after an initial commitment to de-escalation on June 6, brawls on June 15 at the mouth of the Galwan River Valley left 20 Indian soldiers dead — and an undetermined number of Chinese casualties — the first deaths on the border in decades. Since then, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has promised to retaliate if instigated and warned that expansionist powers would lose.

These events are of immense consequence to the United States. American policymakers have contended for years that India plays a “vital” and “pre-eminent role” in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. While U.S.-Indian ties have improved in the last two decades, New Delhi has often been reluctant to align too closely with Washington. The unprecedented violence, intensity of escalation, and recognition of India’s grim options have renewed optimism in the United States that this crisis with China will remove New Delhi’s inhibitions and “push India toward the [United States],” prompting it to “[pick] a side in the new cold war.” Indeed, China’s actions areclearly galvanizing Indian strategic elites to discard hedging for a more assertive approach to the Asian balance of power. As U.S. policymakers express support, strategists like former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy have described this crisis as an opening to “accelerate and deepen security co-operation.”

American defense policymakers and analysts should lean into this opportunity to improve ties with India, but also draw important lessons from this still unfolding episode to inform future strategy. First, India’s resolve to balance China may be hardening, but its internal capacity to do so may be faltering. Second, the crisis has exposed or exacerbated India’s problems of strategic assessment, diversion of resources to its land borders, and its dependence on Russia, which limit India’s synergy with America’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. If this crisis really precipitates an inflection point, analysts should observe a revised approach to the U.S.-India relationship where New Delhi undertakes to substantively balance China, Washington accommodates Indian constraints, and both demonstrate a tolerance for some difficult bargains and creative workarounds.

Solving the “Underbalancing” Problem

A crisis that heightens India’s fears of Chinese aggression renews opportunities for deeper alignment with the United States. Some leaders have long hailed the promise of U.S.-Indian cooperation despite the shortfalls, particularly when it comes to balancing China. But the surprise, intensity, and publicity of this crisis may have jolted India closer to Washington’s more competitive approach to Beijing. The Indian government’s longtime China hands have described this as a “turning point,” and analysts claim “‘strategic ambiguity’ is over.”

India has already shown signs of this. Recently, India expedited the procurement of advanced military equipment (including the purchase or upgrade of almost 100 fighter aircraft) and pursued the early deployment of new air defense systems. India also blocked Chinese apps and obstructed much Chinese investment. It has also publicly tipped its hand at inviting Australia to military exercises with the “Quad” — the informal grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States — and disinviting Huawei from its national 5G trials.

Solidified elite consensus about the Chinese threat, however, may prove insufficient. India has “underbalanced” with respect to China for years. In other words, New Delhi has been slow to build up sufficient military power or alliances to deter Chinese territorial aggrandizement. Besides structural incentives of geography, nuclear weapons, or a perceived defensive advantage, states underbalance less out of naiveté than out of a collective action problem. Serious balancing of an adversary carries considerable costs and risks. Breaking out of underbalancing inertia requires consensus not only on the threat but also the remedy, as well as the elite and social cohesion to mobilize efforts at considerable economic and political costs. Simply put, how much defense spending will Indian society bear with “trade-offs” to development or social welfare? How much political effort will leaders expend on national security reforms at the expense of elections or social engineering? India is unlikely to easily navigate these trade-offs, particularly given eroding social cohesion, deep partisan fights, and an economy that’s reeling under the pressure of the pandemic.

Indian strategic elites, cognizant of the limits to internal balancing, will likely turn to external partners for support. This would be welcome news for U.S. policymakers whose high expectations for the U.S.-Indian relationship have been met with some disappointments due to complacency and inertia on both sides. Nevertheless, American analysts should calibrate expectations given some of the challenges revealed by the crisis.

Problems of Strategic Assessment and Decision-Making

The border crisis has exposed a range of national security “software” problems in India, including deficient intelligence, poor strategic assessment, and miscommunication that may have enabled or abetted the breakdown in deterrence with China.

Accounts of serious Indian intelligence breakdowns, starting with the surprise that a People’s Liberation Army exercise turned into an offensive military operation, are concerning. This may be a result of a combination of factors: insufficient technical means such as military satellite coverage (or misdirected applications by civilian agencies) to continuously monitor the border closely; analytical or interpretation failure without a proper appreciation of China’s intentions; an over-concentration of intelligence and analytical assets on other threats like Pakistan or terrorist groups; or simply a breakdown in the process of moving information up the policy chain. Whatever the precise cause, India failed to take the requisite defensive actions against China despite early warning in February and several intelligence alerts by mid-April.

Second, some observers suggest India may have miscalculated and insufficiently prepared for the consequences of its extraordinary policy moves last summer that helped motivate China’s actions. On Aug. 5, 2019, India took dramatic steps to revoke Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, unilaterally abrogating the autonomy provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir territory disputed with Pakistan, but also implicating its territorial disputes with China. Beijing apparently warned that India’s unilateral moves were “unacceptable” and “[challenged] China’s sovereignty and interests,” and responded with “alarm” and “vehement protest.” The first real signs of more conspicuously aggressive Chinese behavior in Ladakh began the following month. These criticisms of Indian decision-making have been made not to excuse China’s “aggressive posture,” but to question whether the Indian government exercised the strategic competence to “red team” political choices, heed warnings, and prepare for consequences that some contend were eminently predictable.

Source: Read More on Texas National Security Review.

 

 

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