Tag: Africa

China’s Two Sessions: the Centrality of China-Africa Green Cooperation and Why It Matters

Posted on By Musiime George

Each spring, the ‘two sessions;’ China’s biggest political assembly brings together the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) to deliberate on the nation’s broad policy direction for the new year. This year’s two sessions ran from March 04-12, bringing together members of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and representatives from all political parties, industry leaders, academia and prominent figures in Chinese society.

Noteworthy is that, this year’s two sessions came in under five months of the 2025 plenary session and a new 5th five-year plan—that specially stands out for its extraordinary emphasis on high quality development. While it’s anchored on a spectrum of guiding principles, the 15th five-year plan lays special emphasis on the need to accelerate the green transition in all areas of economic and social development. This transition is viewed as a critical element in China’s modernization, building a beautiful China, but also as an inroad to a community with a shared future for humanity.

Incidentally, the 2026 two sessions also fall in the 70th-year of China-Africa friendship. To mark this milestone, both sides are now more than ever focused on the shared aspiration of building an all-weather China-Africa community with a shared future in the new era. This, against a backdrop of unprecedented risks – on the list of which is climate change.

It’s an undeniable fact that climate change threatens livelihoods and sometimes entire national economies across Africa, the global south and indeed the wider world. Depending on where one is, these risks can range from food and water insecurity, disruptions to production and ecological systems, health hazards associated with erratic weather patterns, among others all of which undoubtedly have a bearing on the quality of development.

In the face of such uncertainty, Africa often looks to its friendship with China, China’s experience, technical expertise, high-quality manufacturing capability and record of rapid modernization for inspiration. Moreover, there is great hope that deliberations at the two sessions could reinforce the imperative for further strengthening and directing this partnership towards bolstering Africa’s climate readiness and resilience.

For Africa, climate change is one of the greatest challenges to development yet, the continent’s limited development is a double-edged sword which; besides exposing the continent to severe adversity, also makes it ill-prepared to deal with risks posed by climate change.

Despite being responsible for less than 4 percent of the world’s climate problem, the African Development Bank estimates that Africa loses 3-5 percent of its annual GDP to climate related events. This situation is further made worse by an annual climate financing gap of $227 million. These circumstances create the imperative for a blend of strong partnerships, innovation and practical financing solutions to guarantee climate resilience while fueling the desired growth.

Historically, energy shortages have been one of Africa’s greatest growth-bottlenecks yet, relying entirely on traditional energy sources to close this gap wouldn’t be without substantial environmental consequences. Therefore, in a world where geopolitical and geo-economic competition are placed ahead of a looming climate catastrophe, China-Africa green cooperation is a model for effective climate response. China’s green cooperation framework is a positive development not just for both sides but the world for a number of reasons. First, in addition to the two sides being home to approximately 36-percent of global population, Africa holds about 60 percent of the world’s solar resources which are grossly untapped. Meanwhile, what China lacks in green resources it makes up for in expertise in green development, innovations, clean energy, and competitive manufacturing. This matrix makes the China-Africa green cooperation a partnership of high-potency in the world’s green transition, promising steady progression towards a sustainable energy mix, at least for two of the world’s most populous regions.

To this, China adds ambition, pragmatism and more importantly, structuring cooperation around Africa’s articulated needs, but also global goals in greening the planet. For instance, China’s green cooperation with Africa is highly practical; going beyond policy statements and creating impact on the ground. As a result, cooperation projects can be found all across Africa; from the Noor solar complex in Morocco to the De Aar wind farm in South Africa; together powering upwards of one million households and keeping tons of CO2 out of the atmosphere annually. In East Africa, projects like the Karuma Dam in Uganda, Gibe III dam in Ethiopia and the Garissa solar power plant in Kenya equally have similar benefits.

Away from infrastructure projects, significant progress is visible in areas of capacity building, knowledge and experience sharing aimed at greening the continent. In this regard, there’s no better example than the China-Africa environmental cooperation center (CAECC) established in 2020 under the [Great Green Wall] initiative.  This initiative besides being a hub for sharing knowledge and experience is an avenue for conducting joint research on combating desertification on the continent. The great green wall has played a key in reinforcing the “frontline defense” in Nigeria’s Kano state – a local effort in containing the expansion of the Sahara Desert southwards not to mention its role in carbon sequestration. The great green wall initiative has been influential in reclaiming tens of millions of hectares of land in a region that was previously losing more than 30 hectares to desertification annually.

But the China-Africa green cooperation isn’t a new or an anticipated outcome of the 2026 two sessions because it has been ongoing and growing through time. Even before the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) backed CAECC, the Forum on China-Africa cooperation FoCAC framework had produced the Sharm El Sheik, Beijing, and Addis-Ababa Action Plans, setting the tone for ecological cooperation and sustainable development before 2016. The CAECC has incrementally been given agency through FoCAC where both sides have adopted several Action Plans namely; the Johannesburg Action Plan in 2016-2018, Beijing Action Plan 2019-2021, and Dakar Action Plan 2022-2024. Indeed, besides the series of action plans, the 8 major initiatives and 9 programs during the 2018 FoCAC summit in Beijing also stressed Green transition as a significant pillar of China’s relationship with the continent.

China continues to demonstrate its commitment to working with Africa to tackle its challenges by sharing experiences for accelerated growth through infrastructure and capacity building, human capital training and supporting Africa’s industrialization. Its policy on cooperation with Africa addresses both sustainability and the continent’s articulated aspirations, such as market access and industrialization, as evidenced by President Xi Jinping’s three measures announced at the 2023 BRICS summit in South Africa. Uganda for instance, is working on cooperation arrangements with Cherry automobiles, CHTC, and Zhongtong in the area of electric vehicles (EVs) while Egypt’s Suez Economic Zone with its five solar production establishments is emerging as a solar manufacturing hub on the continent.

As China-Africa green cooperation expands in the era of high quality development, we can expect climate conscious industrialization and green manufacturing to grow simultaneously with economic zones and industrial parks. This will most certainly bring with it — more green industrialization, green jobs for the continent’s youthful population, while ensuring a sustainable path to growth and modernization across the continent.

The writer is a research fellow at the Development Watch Centre

China’s FDI Pivot is Uganda’s Road to Real Growth

Posted on By Shemei Ndawula

The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative has defined Africa’s relationship with China for over a decade. Within this time the average Ugandan’s interaction with China was largely limited to the importation of “cheap” Chinese goods and the Entebbe Expressway. The latter has always been an infamous scapegoat in conversations of the fictitious “Debt trap diplomacy” while the former also triggered misgivings with a belief that lower prices construe a compromise on quality.

Fortunately, these narratives have greatly been discredited with the Entebbe Express still standing as one of Ugandas most ambitious infrastructure projects (the detractors of this development always conveniently forget that Mandela National Stadium was also constructed in the early 2000s with a Chinese loan but the debt has never trapped us). Additionally, Chinese imports have switched the moniker of “cheap” for “reliable value for money” and we now have Chinese brands like the Sinotruck that have become synonymous with construction sites in the Kampala metropolitan. This is exactly how Uganda’s relationship with China has been reshaped, with real work, real progress and mutual benefit.

Now China is taking on it’s biggest challenge yet, the shift from infrastructure development to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the Ugandan economy. This does not simply represent a change in policy; it’s restructuring Uganda’s path to development with a focus on building the industrial and processing capacity of the nation.

China’s dialing down on the big loans and ramping up foreign direct investment fast tracks all development because it means Chinese companies are putting their own cash on the line, becoming partners and not just lenders. It’s definitely a pragmatic approach for China; securing resources and markets, but from the Ugandan perspective it’s a breath of fresh air. In the oil and gas sector the China National Oil Company has invested billions of US Dollars into the Kingfisher field, not as a loan but for an equity stake in the project that will define Ugandas economy for at least the next decade.

This is also a large boon for our national GDP because FDI isn’t money that vanishes after a project is wrapped up,  it’s a long term vote in the country’s future. This is evident in the industrial parks being set up, like  Mbale which Chinese investment has turned into a buzzing industrial hub with factories and assembly lines producing clothes, gadgets, cutlery among others. This puts approximately 10,000 Ugandans on payroll, excluding  auxiliary and support industries such as transporters. The slice of manufacturing in our GDP is pushing 27%  and wiyh this strategy we can expect more impressive numbers because we’re not shipping out raw materials anymore but we’re adding value, processing ores, assembling products for the East African market and beyond.

And the best part is this model builds skills that last. In these joint ventures, Ugandans are learning the ropes from high-tech assembly lines to supply chain tricks. It’s helping us adapt to global market turbulence. When coffee prices tank, having a diverse economy with factories humming along is west keeps the lights on. The government only needs to regulate local content policies so that more of the money stays in Uganda.

The reduced debt burden is also not something to complain about, a huge portion of our national budget is already going to debt repayment so China’s new policy could not have come at a better time. This way, China can meet its commitment to invest in renewable energy like solar panel plants and its bamboo research which matters when climate change hits our farmers hard(Uganda is a frontline state in Global Warming effects). With a population as young as ours (over half under 25) this job creation is crucial and foreign direct investment is the most sustainable approach to facilitate this.

As we gear up for talks like FOCAC next year, we need to keep pushing for deals that put us first. China’s shift in strategy to Foreign Direct Investment could be Uganda’s ticket to high-tech sectors, innovation hubs, all fueled by smart partnerships and technology sharing (Rwanda already got a great deal in its e-vehicle manufacturing plant). It matches our drive for self sustainability and solid growth that does not erase what makes us Ugandan.

 

Making Sense of China’s Foreign Minister, Wang Yi’s 2026 tour of Africa

Posted on By Musanjufu Benjamin Kavubu

As the world was being sent back into barbarism by President Trump’s actions in Venezuela, China was being consistent on the diplomatic front on the African continent. For 36 consecutive years the Chinese foreign ministry has made Africa it’s first stop of the year. It’s now a tradition in global diplomacy that the Chinese foreign minister makes his first formal appearance on the African continent as the year starts. In 2026 foreign minister Wang Yi was to visit Somalia, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Lesotho, but a few last minute changes happened as we shall note in this write up.

2026 marks a seven (7) decade diplomatic milestone between China and Africa relationship. Foreign Minister (FM) Wang Yi started his tour with a visit to Ethiopia one of Beijing’s biggest brain Child on the continent and also Africa’s political capital since it hosts the HQ of the African Union. Ethiopia is one of those African countries that value it’s relationship with China to an extent that, it was the first African country to waiver tarrifs on Chinese electronic vehicles (EVs). Ethiopia in the bid to modernize it’s economy is the second biggest holder of Chinese debt behind Angola on the African continent.

For FM Wang to make Addis Ababa one of his main stop centers on the customary African tour was a geopolitical strategy. Over time there has been a pragmatic mutual relationship between the two countries. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali  and FM Wang Yi held discussions on infrastructure, energy and economic cooperation between the two countries. The Ethiopian head of state stressed the need for cooperation on what he referred to as new energy and AI given the global outlook on technology driving development at the moment. He referred to China as a historical trustworthy strategic partner to Ethiopia. FM Wang Yi said China expects Ethiopia to play a major role in regional and global affairs especially now that it is member of the BRICS.

While in Ethiopia FM Wang Yi officially launched the 2026 China-Africa Year of People-to-People exchange and during the opening ceremony he conveyed the contents of a letter from President Xi Jinping that had the message that emphasized the importance of cultural dialogue and mutual learning to strengthen friendship and advance modernization. President Xi called for closer ties between China and Africa’s 2.8 billion people, promoting Global South solidarity and building a shared future for humanity.

From his meeting with the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) H.E Mahmoud Youssouf, FM Wang Yi issued a joint call to uphold international law, sovereignty and territorial integrity given what had just happened in Venezuela and what is going on with Greenland.  FM Wang Yi emphasized the idea of African solutions to African problems and China would play a predictable supportive long term partner of the journey through its Global Security Initiative and Global Governance Initiative to blaster the AU agenda 2063 and African Union silencing the guns initiative by 2030. For China a peaceful Africa is very important for regional and global trade if prosperity for all is to be archived.

China has tried to put peace at the forefront of it’s agenda in the greater East African region since 2022 actively, when it put in place a special envoy for the Horn of Africa whose objective and task is to resolve conflicts through integration of infrastructure projects like ports and railways rather than political meddling.

Wang Yi trip to Somalia was called off at the last moment for reasons not yet clear but possibly security, but the fact that Mogadishu was on the list was a big statement just after Tel viv tried to compromise the territorial integrity of the country by recognizing Somaliland as an independent state. It was more than a diplomatic gesture because China can relate especially with its situation with Taiwan.

2026 marks the 50 years of the Tanzania-Zambia railway the famous TAZARA that makes Tanzania a very huge strategic piece for China not just in East Africa but on the continent. TAZARA connects the Indian Ocean supply chain to the Zambia and DRC mineral deposits and a huge rival to the US song of the Lobito Corridor that connects Zambia to the Atlantic, but Tanzania for China is more that a supply chain piece. The Chinese leadership School on the African continent is also set up in the country that is supposed to link various African parties to the CCP. FM Wang Yi’s visit to Tanzania would also go a long way to support new Administration that started off on rocky grounds as it was tested from its core a few weeks back.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s last stop was in the South of the continent to the tiny nation of Lesotho, a country that is fully surrounded by South Africa. Lesotho as been at the receiving end of President Trump’s Mafia diplomacy of late, first it was severely affected by Mr. Trump’s tarrifs when he slapped a 50% that has since been reduced to 15% which is still huge for the small nation. Lesotho has also been serious affected by the halting of AGOA that was very critical to its textile industry and they did negotiate with China for alternatives for their products especially now that through FOCAC Africa has Zero tarrifs access to the Chinese market.

At the end of the day FM Wang Yi’s 2026 tour of Africa will go down as a strategic attempt to reinforce Beijing’s role as an alternative geopolitical and geoeconomic pole that offers the global South in general a special avenue of engagement centered on sovereignty, development and institutional partnerships.

The writer is a research fellow at the Sino-Uganda Research Centre.

Uganda’s Social Economic Transformation: China Has Proved it’s a Reliable Partner

Posted on By Joshua Kingdom

When credit agencies, banks, insurance companies, etc. based in countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany declared that they would no longer be involved with anything to do with the activities of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) back in 2024 despite their earlier commitments, things looked rather bleak for the project that had captivated the minds of Ugandans going back decades.

Rather than fall for the scare like everyone else however, the government of China elected to stand with Uganda at this critical moment. The then Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Affairs of the Chinese Foreign Ministry H.E. Xue Bing alongside Beijing’s Ambassador to Kampala H.E. Zhang Lizhong paid a visit to President Museveni carrying a response letter to his request that  China come to Uganda’s rescue. In the document, President Xi Jinping who also doubles as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) expressed “full support” for EACOP and pointed out that if its promise came to fruition, the venture would “enhance socio-economic development for the region”.

What China demonstrated here then was that even with the complications that surrounded this project, the best approach towards the situation was one that sought to harness its potential while minimizing the downsides as opposed to opting for cheap popularity. This is what distinguishes a true partner from actors that look to take advantage of a country’s endowments when they get to know about them provided they can get away with it unscathed.

Indeed, the EACOP picture that has emerged post China’s involvement ably represents Beijing’s sophistication i.e. sustainability queries as well as the fate of project affected persons have been given priority but that has not deterred progress on what the overall endeavor had been expected to realize. As recent as mid-December 2025 thus, water prices in areas such as Kabayoola and Nseese in Sembabule District came down from UGX. 1,000 per jerry can to UGX. 100 thanks to EACOP associated corporate social responsibility campaigns. At the same time, the pipeline construction had generated at least 8,000 jobs and initiated $500 million worth in local procurement by the time it hit the 50% completion point (we are now past 75%) according to the Uganda Chamber of Energy and Minerals. This is to say nothing of the US$1–2.5 annual revenue that the pipeline will bring in once it has been completed of course.

The EACOP initiative though is best understood not as a one-off but as a piece that fits perfectly with a pattern that has characterized China-Uganda interstate affairs for a while. Take the field of infrastructure for which collaboration between the two countries stands on years and years of close ties for instance, and you will find several examples that equally represent this spirit. With Karuma Hydro (a plant first conceived in the late 90s), it was only after the government picked on M/S Synohydro Corporation Limited on top of securing funding from the Export-Import Bank (Yes, previous partners abandoned the venture) that the big dream finally came to see the day of light in 2024. Relatedly, Uganda Civil Aviation Authority has reported that the ongoing expansion at Entebbe International Airport has been enabled by a concessional loan from China that carries minimal interest.

Beijing’s role in Uganda’s Healthcare has been instrumental too. A fitting illustration here is the China-Uganda Friendship Hospital in Naguru which, though initially starting with modest goals, has been at the receiving end of huge donations from the CPC as the demand for its services have grown. This includes a $5 million grant given to the facility through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) a little over a year ago.

China equally rose to the occasion during the 2024/2025 fiscal year when western donors announced that they would be significantly cutting malaria related aid in heavy proportions not least because of the ruckus brought about by Elon Musk and his Department of Government Efficiency gimmicks. In that case, Beijing’s embassy in Kampala sourced $1.1 million worth of anti-malaria drugs to fill the gap. To appreciate how much of a big deal this is, one ought to recall that the roughly 100,000 Ugandans that succumb to this sickness each other year mean that we come in seventh place on the list of nations that are worst hit by it worldwide.

There are many other examples that I could pick on to illustrate this further but one more should suffice given what we have already explored. The first half of 2025 saw coffee exportation to China in Uganda multiply by 190% thanks to the zero-tariffs policy entered under FOCAC early in the year. The sum-total of these scenarios then is an ally that has been willing to go through thick-and-thin with Kampala not only through words but vivid real-life incidents that back them just as much.

For Uganda and the current government in particular, one can safely argue that the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government has been in position to fulfill most of their promises of mega projects the NRM party is currently partly campaigning on thanks to China’s win-win cooperation with Uganda.

The writer is a research fellow at the Development Watch Centre. 

 

2025 Saw More Consolidation of China-Africa Ties

Posted on By Joshua Kingdom

2025 was significant as far as China-Africa relations go. For one thing, a major reception was hosted in June in Huan Province to mark twenty five years since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Now that we are in December, it is deserving that we take a moment to reflect on the different milestones that characterized the Beijing-Africa partnership throughout the year.

In executing the task ahead of me, I have divided the piece in three broad areas and we will start with Trade. I elected to begin with the economics because while development partners often talk about having good intentions in their dealings on the continent, following the money always provides clarity about who means what they say.

Whichever metric one looks at, it is clear that there has been tremendous growth in economic activity between China and Africa over the last twelve months. By May thus, trading between the two parties had already reached  $134.16 billion an increase of 12% in comparison to 2024. In part, this owed to the fact that Africa provided an alternative market to Beijing following Trump’s trade war. But performance also increased in terms of the quantity of exports from the African Union states. As Africanews reported in August, the said nations had shipped out over $18 billion worth of goods by then to different regions of the Communist Party (CCP) administered territory. That figure as well, exceeds last year’s state of things.

What is more is that many of these endeavors built on what came before them while others ensured the smoothening of future collaborations. This helps frame the CCP-Africa workings as long-term thereby showing just how either of the players values the other. In regards to building on past commitments, Capital News reported in June that the Chinese government had continued to deliver on President Xi Jinping’s promise at the 2024 Beijing summit by elevating agriculture, healthcare, green growth, security etc. and that more than 45,000 jobs had been created up to that point. As for the future, the Changsha Declaration which removed tariffs on African exports to China for fifty-three countries is perhaps the single-most overarching mark arrived at this year.

Again, in order to consolidate the progress realized thus far in Africa, Beijing continued with what has been one of its signature campaigns for the last decade or so i.e. infrastructure development. By mid-2025 therefore, the Green Finance and Development Centre revealed that the Belt and Road Initiative had already seen projects worth $39 billion embarked on. As with trade, the Communist Party of China and her African allies sought to get involved in pursuits that cement their cooperation for years to come.

Among other ventures, this spirit was evidenced by the China-Africa Internet Development and Cooperation Forum hosted in Xiamen. The first of its kind, the Xiamen forum laid down foundations for partnerships in cyberspace and telecommunication that will span decades. The other part of this specific development equation was the rehabilitation of existing constructions as evidenced by the $1.4 billion agreement to revamp the Tazara railway.

2025 was also characterized by high level delegations of leaders flying across the Indian Ocean traveling in either direction. This too is a crucial signifier of countries taking each other seriously since high ranking officials are busy people who only attend to matters of utmost priority to their agendas. In other words, this is another case of actions speaking far louder than words.

For China’s case then, foreign minister Wang Yi kept up with the long tradition of his country in which officials occupying his current position travel to Africa for all their first visits each year. In this case, the FM paid courtesy calls to Namibia, Nigeria, Chad, and the Republic of Congo in January. And in November, the second most senior ranking member of the Communist Party, Premier Li Qiang visited both Zambia and South Africa. Similarly, Presidents William Ruto, John Dramani, Hakainde Hichilema, and Emmerson Mnangagwa of Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe respectively headed missions to China at different times this year.

There is more that I could say including the dynamism showcased by the private sector (say Yadea’s showcasing of electric bikes purposefully designed for the African terrain) but that would require a lot more than I am able to fit in a single column. I hope though that you now have an idea of the trajectory that things followed this year.

The writer is a Lawyer and Research Fellow at the Development Watch Centre.

 

 

 

China’s New Five- Year Plan Approved: Africa Anticipates Opportunities and Strategic Benefits

Posted on By Musanjufu Benjamin Kavubu

Dear Editor, Last month, China held its 20th Central Committee meeting also referred to as the fourth plenary session. It was in Beijing from October 20th to 23rd, 2025. This vital political meeting has been the defining road for China since 1953 and has set the direction in social and economic development for the last 7 decades as well as global strategy at a 5-year basis.

The meeting was attended by 168 full members and 147 alternate members from various disciplines. The members ranged from ministry heads, scholars and grassroots representatives. The political bureau takes the lead and this is headed by the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping. He delivered the report that is supposed to steer China for the next five years. The report Was discussed and it’s recommendation approved as the country’s blue print for 2026-2030. The adopted plan also acts as Beijing’s vision for the decade ending in 2035 when socialist modernization should be realized.

During the meeting the previous 5 year plan for 2021-2025 was scrutinized, despite the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) that posed all sorts of challenges according to the central committee, China was able to reach what they referred to as material progress with social harmony, environmental protection and cultural confidence. In the past five years, China realized it is entering a new modernization phase. China now believes they are no longer in the foundation stage but seek to accelerate modernization.

In his address to the session President Xi Jinping outlined the complexities of the global political and economic outlook. Therefore there is a need for a continued strong industrial foundation, having a massive domestic market, an internal complete supply chain, rich and reach human resource and long term planning based on a unique socialist system.

In the discussions that followed according to the final communique of the plenum it was established that China’s trajectory is indeed strong and ready to take on strong economic winds and rough waves especially in the international arena. The adapted to move on the principal of stability with progress. The plenum stressed that economic growth should be along side innovation, green transition and human development beyond GDP numbers. There is going to be a focus on quality growth that matches the  quantative growth. This aspect is one all growing economies should put in the spotlight, economies tend to grow bigger but not better. For China the aspect of better is about quality of livelihoods for individuals.

In the next five years China is going to embark on a series of comprehensive reforms across sectors to make sure it  gains technological independence, expand domestic demand as it seeks to move away from supply side and most importantly national security and social stability. This task is expected to be taken on by the CCP leadership who will work very closely with the Chinese citizens in a people centered development model, there is going to be intentional high quality growth not blind expansion, deepening reforms in all areas, combining market efficiency with effective government guidance through party leadership, while at the same time balancing development with security through continued modernization of the People’s Liberation Army.

The markers for 2030 for China are going to be scientific innovation, quality growth for ordinary citizens, according to the communique there should be breakthrough reforms across sectors something that sounds very interesting, upgrade in social civilization alongside cultural confidence that will shape China’s soft power going into the next decade. Major achievements in green and sustainable development, already a third of China’s electricity is from renewable technology.

The 2026-2030 plan for China seeks to propel the country through the economy, defense and technology to pragmatic global influence by 2035. As a central planning measure China will not abandon its place as leaders in manufacturing but will instead aggressively pursue industrial modernization while protecting the environment. The plenum also stressed that China will not sit back on the technology front but will seek to be at the forefront on cutting edge in AI, aerospace, quantum computing and green technologies in the bid for self reliance.

Through the meeting Beijing made it clear that they will not close their doors to the world, instead they will pursue a high level opening up strategy, they made it clear they will take part in global cooperation as they promote win-win outcomes. China through their five years plan also pledged to defend multilateral trade systems, expand institutional opening up at home to facilitate what they referred to as two way investment while furthering high quality cooperation within most importantly the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China is going to be very intentional about sharing their modernization outcomes but they will be pragmatic about it that it will have to be at their terms.

China’s next five year plan is clear about moving their economy from a supply side to a demand driven one, China in 2025 fully opened up their economy to African exports at duty free access, this is an opportunity for the continent to play into the great plan, as they seek to move their GDP per Capital to $ 25,000 in their bid to reach moderate rich economy status.

It’s wise that Africa moves closer to China when it comes to research especially in areas that will spark industrial modernization with vast untapped resources under the continents soils. African countries have long term development plans with the African Union leading with its 2063 agenda but it’s important they break them down to into shorter term 5 year plans like China has done for 70 years to reach where they are, maybe then we shall truly know how effective these five year plans are.

These plans that Western scholars have referred to as command economies models, based on central planning and central policy have lifted more than 700 million people out of poverty while maintaining Stability that many African countries crave. If the global South, Africa in particular treated planning with China’s discipline, they will be able to write their own story for modernization by 2050.

The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Contemporary China Africa Studies, Uganda.

Global South Partnership: China-Africa Cooperation is Good for Global Diplomacy

Posted on By Abdurahim Ssemanda

The Global South Media and Think Tank Forum China-Africa Partnership Conference which was held in South Africa-Johannesburg on November 13, 2025, was a perfect step made at a perfect time. For some bold reasons as elaborated below, I will confidently say that this is yet another great step of China-Africa partnership whose results must help a lot to shape Global diplomacy.

Reechoing the words of America’s author and entrepreneur, Amy Jo Martin, “ Social media is the ultimate equalizer. It gives a voice and a platform to anyone willing to engage,” I can emphatically say that social media had ruined and is ruining global diplomacy and such a conference, plays a big role in restoring order.

For instance, the conference whose theme was “ Reforming Global Governance: New Roles and Visions for China-Africa Cooperation,” the conference’s main target was to analyze how the collaboration between media and think tanks could result into a better-for-all global governance.

This implies that the conference created enough room for mass awareness of the roles of think tanks vis-à-vis media, especially print media like newspapers. Culturally, newspapers have been one of the most dropped sources of providing information over the ages as civilization advances. This has made the print media to be left aside for a few elites, topped by digital media like TikTok and Facebook. This ultimately points out the view that the conference’s masterminds identified a crucial problem of information disorders largely engineered by digital media.

The simplest response to the why-question that has popped up into your mind especially after my opinion on digital media is; the reading culture is decaying. People, especially the biggest percentage of the world’s population which is made up of the youth prefer scrolling up and down on their devices to watch short videos for information, and tapping other pieces of information from platforms like Facebook than reading newspapers.

How this is a constraint to global diplomacy can easily be seen through the lens of foreign policy, aware that foreign policy feeds global diplomacy. As reflected in the words of Amy Jo earlier, social media especially digital media, “ Gives a voice and a platform to anyone willing to engage.” This makes it the easily manipulated type of media because “anyone” is given a voice and platform to engage. It does not matter whether you are academically qualified to discuss pertinent issues as long as you are able to speak. This trend cannot be found within the print media where think tanks and media houses must write and research in order to provide thoroughly analyzed and well backed up information.

Two forms of information disorders heavily influence how information trends under digital media because it is often mishandled in the name of “content” yet it is greatly consumed by the biggest number of audiences who believe that such information is true without verification.

Misinformation is the biggest problem in Uganda and it greatly affects diplomatic ties of several countries. This is where the information being spread is false, but the person disseminating it believes it is true. In other words, they also do not know if the information is true or not, but for the love of likes from the audience, they go ahead and circulate such information. Remember social media gives a voice and platform to “anyone.”

I cite China-Uganda relations as a key example where social media has for some good number of times sabotaged the relations of these two states. In 2021, earth-quaking headlines emerged on various social media platforms and on social media handles of prominent bloggers in Uganda. The invalid but widely believed news that Chinese bank had taken Uganda’s only international airport spread like wildfire.

The misinformers picked on an interesting bit of information, clung on it, and made the public to believe them. HUEN—which is an International Civil Aviation Organization location indicator code for Entebbe international airport, became their mask of support. Since the airport had been expanded to fit the international standards with the help of loans from the Exim Bank of China under the Belt and Road Initiative, upon its completion, the airport gained that code.

However, to the misinformers, the code sounded like a Chinese name replacing “Entebbe”. Maybe we could say “Chen,” one of the commonest Chinese names. Little did they know or bother to make research to realize that each letter in that code implies something. For instance, “H” is a locator for all airports in Africa according to ICAO. “U” indicates Uganda as the main location of the airport. “EN” represents the real name of the airport (Entebbe) since ICAO normally uses the first two letters of the airport to award it a code.

Such information was easily believed owing to the nature of the code’s pronunciation and given the fact that by then, the Western narrative of “debt trap” slapped against China was waving across the globe.

With disinformation, where the information is false and the person disseminating it knows it, but intentionally goes ahead to lie, is also common. We can refer to the previous example. Since 2021 was a season of politics in Uganda, some political opportunists saw this as an advantage to achieve their agendas. Of course, this affected the least informed biggest percentage of people on ground who depend on social media as their source of information.

Previously, the same issue has reappeared. On 17th August 2025, President Museveni comissioned the Wagagai gold mining project in Busia District. The project is believed to achieve 99.9% purity in gold processing locally and create over 5,000 jobs for Ugandans. To achieve this, Uganda collaborated with China, seeking provision of capital-intensive infrastructure and resource extraction projects to secure access to critical minerals, foster economic ties, and promote local value addition. However, bloggers were too quick to say that a clique of people in power were secretly selling gold to China.

This was based on the assumption that there was little information available about this project. Little did they know that official handles of China’s embassy in Uganda had already provided this information. The only problem was—such information was provided on twitter where there is fewer audience unlike on Facebook and TikTok where the audience is big and exploited by bloggers.

Therefore, the Johannesburg conference was remarkably important for letting the audience know of other sources of information like think tanks where one can find trusted information. It also gave a green light to think tanks to know that they are also trusted pillars to the media towards shaping coherent and inclusive global diplomacy. In the end, this will not support China and Africa alone, foreign policy feeds global diplomacy.

The writer is a research fellow at the Development Watch Centre.

 

Africa Must Reposition as China Recalibrates After The Forth CPC Plenary Session

Posted on By Musiime George

The 20th Central committee of the Communist Party held its forth plenary session between October 20th-24th 2025 during which a new 5-year plan (2026-2031) was adopted. While it might be tempting to dismiss China’s five-year plan as a domestic affair, this plan will among other things provide the scaffolding for China’s foreign policy over the next 5-years. In this five-year plan, the world’s 2nd largest economy outlines its strategy for thriving amidst a perilous international system. The key question therefore is what the evolution in Africa’s biggest trading partner means for the continent’s development ambitions. As China emphasizes deepening reforms, high quality development, refining regional economic layout and coordinated economic development, modernization and self-reliance, Africa must also undertake strategic realignments of its own to deepen cooperation and maintain its development aspirations.

The communique of last week’s 4th plenary session of the central committee doubled down on ensuring development and security, advancing high quality development, and improving science and technology self-reliance. This came against a backdrop of uncertain trade environment and, growing protectionism especially regarding technology products. The ban on exports of AI chips by the United States for example compounds into risks to the country’s technological aspirations. Conversely, linking steering new science and technology, quality production and modern industrial systems with refining regional economic layouts, China aims to build resilience against similar shocks in global supply chains. Furthermore, evidence of past positive initiatives to increase investments in Africa, spur industrialization, and technology transfers between China and Africa show that through proper alignment, Africa can continue to reap strategic benefits from China’s high-quality development.

A potential shift from Large scale infrastructure projects towards digital and green projects financing. Africa has been on the receiving end of billions of dollars in large infrastructure project financing for roads, rail, and hydropower over the past 2 decades yet, a possible shift towards green and digital projects will still not come as a shock for some reason. In 2021 for example, China made a commitment not to invest in new coal projects – mirroring a shift in its global strategy towards green energy sources. Moreover, China’s strategy for Africa is structured in linked phases to support Africa’s modernization path. Following consistent investment in infrastructure through the BRI for instance, President Xi announced; at the Johannesburg BRI conference in 2023, three measures of focus for Africa’s modernization i.e. industrialization, agricultural modernization and talent development. Obviously, these measures could only be layered over previous achievements in addressing bottlenecks in infrastructure. With a fast growing population also comes increased potential for greenhouse emission and other challenges. Thus harnessing this shift could be an opportunity to position the continent for the increasingly green and digital future that is to come.

The emphasis given to self-reliance and high quality development at the last plenary session further underscores China’s view of strategic independence as in an uncertain world, and as a corollary, a stronger global south solidarity. Stronger southern solidarity has for long been a cornerstone of China’s call for multipolar diplomacy and for Africa, this means increased wiggle-room in the continent’s interactions with the international system. Whereas China has accumulated substantial resources to get along in the existing global system, as the leading member of the global south, reasserting its independence against international bullying directly reinforces the position of the region where Africa is a major constituent.

One area that is likely to see the least disruptive changes though  is governance. In many ways, for countries of the global south, China has become a source of policy learning. With special focus given to upholding leadership, putting people first in last week’s session, we’re likely to see further fine-tuning of China’s governance model, long-term. Under continuing China-Africa friendship, cooperation, exchanges and experience sharing will be an opportunity to refine Africa’s own governance in order to stay on track towards the continent’s own development aspirations including agenda 2063. Nevertheless, as we are constantly cautioned, this cannot be treated as an ideological transplant because national realities play a major role in the final outcome. A focus on what is workable and tailoring ideas to national realities must remain at the core of this ideological learning.

The resolutions of the 4th plenary session will without a doubt provide a strategic anchor point for the totality of China-Africa cooperation over the coming five years. Keeping this reality in mind, the task for Africa’s policy makers needs to be on viewing this development pragmatically rather than religiously. Indeed, Africa must step up to the challenge and become a co-architect in building mutually beneficial engagements if the continent is to stay steadfast in pursuing its aspirations. For indigenous inspiration, the continent can look to South Africa’s role in the BRICS partnership. Whereas Africa aspires for a fairer and equitable world, a deficit of African agency, will complicate and stifle the attainment of this aspiration.

As Africa works towards its development goals, China is increasingly becoming a major partner in different ways – from trade and commerce, green innovations, science and technology and governance among others. The reality is, Africa’s and China’s destinies are increasingly becoming meshed together and to the continent,  last week’s resolutions are far from mere domestic reforms. As the continent’s major partner, China’s domestic economic and political evolutions will certainly influence the continent’s development landscape. Now, whether this is in a positive or negative direction will greatly depend on Africa’s ability to align its strategy with evolving trends in its partner’s strategy and, playing an active role in the ensuing engagements.

The writer is a research fellow at the Development Watch Centre.

China’s Role in the Lobito Corridor

Posted on By Nnanda Kizito Sseruwagi

The Lobito Corridor is a rail and infrastructure project spanning 1,300 km from the port of Lobito in Angola to the mining regions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia. It was originally developed in 1902 as the Benguela Railway, and its construction was completed in 1931. It was primarily engineered to connect extensive mining interests from the inner African territories of what is now Zambia and the DRC to the Atlantic Ocean, allowing for the export of resources to Europe and the Americas. In contemporary times, trade, industrialisation, and the regional integration of Southern Africa are the main objectives served by the corridor. The project diversifies trade links as well as creates opportunities for developmental projects.

It is also the flagship initiative of the Group of 7 (G7)’s collaborative effort to fund infrastructure projects in developing countries under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII or PGI). This frames the Lobito corridor as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, when one observes the project’s history, it is easy to see that it is “a purely commercial entity with zero geopolitical considerations,” as Nicholas Fournier, the CEO of the Lobito Atlantic Railway, said recently.

At the centre of the corridor is the exportation of critical minerals. The development dividends hoped to be benefited by African countries include: investments in roads, energy, and digital infrastructure. The project is backed by multilateral investments worth up to $10 billion, aimed at bridging Africa’s infrastructure gaps.

In Angola, the key minerals extracted include diamonds, rare earth elements (REEs), copper, cobalt, and lithium. The DRC holds 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves and ranks as the world’s second-largest copper producer. It also has lithium, tin, tantalum, and tungsten. Zambia boasts Africa’s second-largest copper deposits, after the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and it also holds significant reserves of cobalt, nickel, and manganese.

As a country with a long-standing presence in Africa’s economic affairs, China has a strategic interest in the Lobito Corridor. The mining and infrastructure sectors, specifically those relevant to the Lobito corridor, are also deeply intertwined with China’s development projects in Africa.

In 2006, the China Railway 20th Bureau Group Corporation (CR20), a subsidiary of the China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC), initiated extensive renovations on the railway, which continued until 2014. The China Eximbank funded the construction with a loan of up to $2 billion to the Angolan government. In China’s revitalisation of the corridor, it created over 25,000 local jobs and trained more than 5,000 Angolan technicians. The rail network now handles 67 stations following the upgrade designs, with trains travelling at speeds of up to 90 km/hr. It also has the capacity to carry 20 million tons of cargo and four million passengers.

Therefore, besides the primary and local players, including Angola, the DRC, Zambia, and Tanzania (which is considered in the planned extension of the corridor to the Indian Ocean via the TAZARA railway), China is a major actor in the re-establishment of the Lobito Corridor. Whereas Western players present the Lobito Corridor as an alternative to the eastward routes, such as TAZARA, the future of the corridor lies in connecting it to the TAZARA railway line, not excluding it.

The TAZARA Railway was built in the 1970s with an interest-free loan from Mao Zedong’s China. It was at the time a symbol of African independence and Sino-African cooperation, as it helped landlocked Zambia export its copper and other resources through Tanzania’s port of Dar es Salaam, bypassing the apartheid-era Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa.

Given that China already dominates the mining sector in the region, it cannot be sidelined from the development of the Lobito Corridor. Chinese companies own 80% of the DRC’s copper mines and are also responsible for digging up 85% of the DRC’s rare earth minerals, which are essential in EV battery manufacturing. As such, the Lobito corridor can only be commercially viable if it depends on Chinese mining companies exporting minerals from the DRC and Zambia.

For the African countries, there are fundamental issues to handle regarding the Lobito Corridor. Whereas the corridor is designed to connect mineral-rich regions to the Atlantic Ocean for ease of access to global markets, the export of raw minerals is deleterious to the long-term development of African countries. Industrial growth can only occur if there is value added to the minerals mined. Therefore, whereas it is good to develop the Lobito Corridor, there must be negotiations by Angola, DRC, Zambia and other countries to ensure that there is no perpetual exportation of raw materials, as that would mean exporting jobs, higher value of the minerals, and the development of industrial techniques would be denied our people.

The writer is a senior research fellow at the Development Watch Centre.

FOCAC and TICAD: The Competition for African Partnership

Posted on By Nnanda Kizito Sseruwagi

As economic stagnation and major country rivalries for economic and political partners continue to shape global politics, the focus is increasingly shifting to Africa. It is one continent that now occupies a strategic position due to its large natural resource reserves and its great potential as a continent with the world’s youngest population and nascent industries. Unlike most continents, Africa has room for growth and transformation. It is therefore not surprising that the Far Eastern countries of China and Japan have uniquely shown a deeper interest in Africa, each organising summits for African leaders at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), respectively. On one hand, China’s expansive approach in its relations with Africa focuses on state-orchestrated financial commitments while also pursuing ideological alignment through its global initiatives. For Japan, the focus is on innovative, private-sector-driven engagement with a focus on building multilateral resilience.

This article focuses on the Ninth FOCAC Summit, which was held in September 2024 in Beijing and the Ninth TICAD Summit, held in August 2025 in Yokohama, Japan. We shall compare the number of African presidents in attendance at each summit, analyse the significance of the issues discussed in plenary sessions, while also weighing the promises made by China and Japan to African countries in pursuance of their development goals as articulated in Agenda 2063 and the SDGs.

China’s FOCAC seems to always draw more numbers of African leaders, although both FOCAC and TICAD summits are strategically organised to alternate between African countries and China or Japan every three years. Having the two summit diversifies opportunities for African leaders to complement the benefits earned from both countries.

We can have a picture of the significance of FOCAC and TICAD based on the turnout they registered of African heads of state. In 2024, more than 38 African presidents attended the FOCAC summit in China. All African countries were represented at least by a Vice President, Prime Minister or Foreign Minister, except Eswatini, the only country without diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Among those in attendance were South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, Nigeria’s Tinubu, Kenya’s Ruto, Tanzania’s Samia Suluhu Hassan, Zimbabwe’s Emmerson Mnangagwa, Senegal’s Bassirou Diomaye Faye, Togo’s Faure Gnassingbé, Mali’s Assimi Goïta, Sudan’s Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Comoros’ Azali Assoumani, Djibouti’s Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, and Madagascar’s Andry Rajoelina. Others included leaders of; Mali, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger. In attendance was also Moussa Faki Mahamat, the chairperson of the African Union Commission. It is easy to observe China’s vitality as Africa’s development partner, given the pull and success that the last FOCAC summit had. At the end of the summit, over 100 agreements were signed, in comparison with 64 cooperation documents signed at TICAD 9.

By comparison, at least 13 African presidents, 15 prime ministers, and three vice presidents attended the ninth edition of TICAD in Yokohama, Japan.

 

 

The TICAD 9 Summit featured vibrant discussions on a wide range of development themes concerning Africa. The summit was segmented into various sessions to discuss pertinent issues. There were discussions about Africa’s urban awakening and catalysing economic growth and jobs. The conference examined challenges and the potential of urbanisation in Africa. The panellists shared insights from the latest World Bank reports and cases from Japanese cities, and explored how to leverage urbanisation to expand economic opportunities and improve employment outcomes. It should be noted that the World Bank was a co-organiser and, therefore, was actively involved in shaping and implementing the core themes of the conference.

The ninth TICAD summit also brought together venture capital firms, Japanese public-sector partners, and a multilateral development bank to discuss how best to support startups and venture enterprises from Africa and Japan that contribute to addressing social development challenges in Africa. It also delved into how the global aid architecture impacts development outcomes in Africa, and discussions were held on practical recommendations to reform aid systems for maximum SDG impact.

In general, TICAD 9 reflected Japan’s shift from an aid giver/ donor to a trade partner that prioritises the private sector. This shift, if it gets implemented well, will certainly be more transformative for African countries as compared to donations/ aid.

At the 2024 FOCAC, China pledged $50 billion in financial support to Africa over the next three years. In contrast, Japan pledged to contribute up to a maximum of $5.5 billion for the next four years under the Expansion of the Enhanced Private Sector Assistance for Africa (EPSA). Japan also promised to mobilise $1.5 billion in impact investments through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to foster private sector development in Africa.

At FOCAC, China highlighted some of the contributions it has already made. It has built over 10,000 km of rail and 100,000 km of roads. Over 100 clean energy projects have been funded under FOCAC, and 50% of public funding for Africa’s clean energy sector is funded by China. China has also been Africa’s number one trading partner for the past 15 years. 70% of Africa’s 4G Network was built by China, etc.

In conclusion, whereas TICAD has a longer history compared to FOCAC, over time, African leaders and their nations have tended to shift increasingly towards China in their bilateral relations, as shown by the number of cooperation agreements signed at each of the respective summits. It should be remembered that TICAD was established in 1993 with a goal to refocus international attention on African development amid the post-Cold War aid fatigue. The inaugural FOCAC summit was in 2000, and it was proposed by African diplomats in the late 1990s in response to growing bilateral ties between the two entities.

The writer is a senior research fellow at the Development Watch Centre.