Exploring strategic benefits in Uganda-China military cooperation

By Nnanda Kizito Sseruwagi

China-Uganda relations are visibly deepening, with military cooperation assuming center stage in the most recent interactions between the two countries. For the first time in the history of collaboration which officially began in 1962, China has deployed a military attaché or military diplomat to Uganda. This happened in July of this year, as publicly reported when Col. Zhang Hao made a courtesy call to the Chief of Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF), Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba at the Special Forces Command (SFC) headquarters in Entebbe.

The official website of UPDF reported the story (which was also shared by the X handle of China’s ambassador to Uganda, HE Zhang Lizhong, noting that Gen. Kainerugaba and Col Zhang had reaffirmed the historical ties between Uganda and the People’s Republic of China, and acknowledged the significance of their nations’ enduring friendship and cooperation.

It is important at this point to reflect on the significance of the deployment of a military attaché by China to Uganda. Traditionally, military attachés are high-ranking members of the armed forces who are assigned to embassies with the responsibility for communication and coordination between their home country’s defense apparatus and the host nation. Therefore, it is not surprising that Zhang Hao, the new military attaché from China is a colonel, one of the highest-ranking ranks in the armed forces.

Certainly, Col. Zhang’s deployment now implies that China has found it essential to deepen its bilateral relations with Uganda on the frontiers of security. The military attaché will most likely support China’s traditional diplomats at the embassy, advising them on security and defense issues between China and Uganda, since he is more well-grounded in understanding military strategy, with a grasp of international relations and geopolitics.

As reported by the UPDF, Col. Zhang and Gen. Kainerugaba pledged to enhance military collaboration in areas of mutual interest, it is plausible that both Uganda and China stand to gain. It is even more telling that Col. Zhang was deployed to Uganda following recent engagements between Gen. Muhoozi with the Chinese Ambassador to Uganda and a delegation from China North Industries Group Corporation Limited (NORINCO), one of the world’s largest defence companies.

Col. Zhang will likely play a pivotal role as an intermediary between China and Uganda’s security services. Therefore, there will be an easing of communication and fluent coordination of joint military exercises between our two countries. Some countries in the region such as Tanzania and Mozambique have already started conducting tactical training in a counterterrorism drill with China. Uganda will as such not be the first country to effectively collaborate with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on security matters, especially in combating terrorism. Even more important to note is the fact that Chinese literature on military strategy shaped the ideological basis for the liberation war fought by President Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) in the 1980s. It was termed a “protracted people’s war,” a terminology emanating from Mao Zedong, the founding father of the People’s Republic of China who wrote “On Protracted War,” a work in which he argues for a protracted people’s war as a means for small revolutionary groups to fight against the power of the state. Since NRA won the war, Uganda represents to China a part of the world where its ideological influence was successfully executed and prominently survives to this day.

Defence cooperation between our two countries will also deepen our economic and political ties, which will prove necessary for Uganda to attain its development goals encapsulated in “Vision 2040.” Security is usually not only a good thing in itself but also an enabler of other benefits such as peace and stability, which are essential attributes for any country to develop. That’s why military cooperation between our two countries should not be looked at merely as about the military, but the stability of our political order, which also affects our economic standing.

China also stands to gain from this partnership. Uganda’s military profile in the region is high, with a record of pacifying eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Somalia and Central African Republic (CAR), among other regions of Africa where our army has played a great role in stabilizing countries and fighting terrorism. With investments under the Belt and Roads Initiative (BRI) spread across Sub-Saharan Africa, China needs an African partner to protect them. Thus, part of our deepening military cooperation could involve securing China’s trade routes in East and Central Africa, which benefits both our countries.

With one of the most advanced defence forces in the world in terms of the most-advanced technology, smartest military advisors and sharpest tactical skills, Uganda should leverage military cooperation with China to modernize its armed forces. Uganda should not only buy but also, and most importantly, learn how to manufacture military equipment. Therefore, we should have the transfer of technology from Chinese defence companies like NORINCO to Ugandan companies like The National Enterprise Corporation (NEC), which manufactures military products. Indeed, NEC, just like NORINCO, could do much more than manufacture weapons. Some of the most significant military inventions historically are things that we use every day in the civilian world, such as the internet, tea bags, nylon, super glue, canned food, blood transfusion, etc. Therefore, NEC could harness technology from China and venture into fields like automobile manufacturing, manufacture engineering products, chemicals, etc.

In conclusion, deepening military ties between Uganda and China has the potential to serve each of our interests better. One of China’s iterations in its international relations is the principle of “win-win cooperation.” But for both sides to win, Uganda too needs to proactively strategize to utilize China’s advancement in military technology to build Uganda’s defence forces, but also achieve economic benefits that emanate from such cooperation such as technology transfers.

The author is a research fellow at the Development Watch Center.  

Why are coups always led by colonels?

 

By Elizabeth Dickinson.

Passport‘s brilliant editor, Joshua Keating, asked me a very good question the other day: why does it seem like African coups are always led by middle-ranking military officers? The recent coup in Niger was led by Col. Salou Djibo, a “little known commander of a platoon based near the capital.” Guinea’s coup in late 2008 put …

Passport‘s brilliant editor, Joshua Keating, asked me a very good question the other day: why does it seem like African coups are always led by middle-ranking military officers? The recent coup in Niger was led by Col. Salou Djibo, a “little known commander of a platoon based near the capital.” Guinea’s coup in late 2008 put the erratic and paranoid Captain Moussa Dadis Camara at the country’s helm.  Then of course there’s Libya’s Col. Qaddafi, who has proclaimed himself King of Kings but hasn’t risen in military rank since seizing power in a coup in 1969.

So what gives? Why aren’t the generals the ones kicking out the countries’ regimes? I have a few thoughts.

Passport’s brilliant editor, Joshua Keating, asked me a very good question the other day: why does it seem like African coups are always led by middle-ranking military officers? The recent coup in Niger was led by Col. Salou Djibo, a “little known commander of a platoon based near the capital.” Guinea’s coup in late 2008 put …

Passport‘s brilliant editor, Joshua Keating, asked me a very good question the other day: why does it seem like African coups are always led by middle-ranking military officers? The recent coup in Niger was led by Col. Salou Djibo, a “little known commander of a platoon based near the capital.” Guinea’s coup in late 2008 put the erratic and paranoid Captain Moussa Dadis Camara at the country’s helm.  Then of course there’s Libya’s Col. Qaddafi, who has proclaimed himself King of Kings but hasn’t risen in military rank since seizing power in a coup in 1969.

So what gives? Why aren’t the generals the ones kicking out the countries’ regimes? I have a few thoughts.

Why not the generals? At least in the countries I know in West Africa, this makes perfect sense. Generals are often close to the leadership; their appointments are usually somewhat political and come with the benefit of a bit of patronage and a lot of pomp and circumstance.  I met Generals in Nigeria who led more comfortable lifestyles than some Lagos bankers. They’re educated, often cosmopolitan, and know that they have more to lose through a coup than by simply staying put. They have no reason to upset the  status quo. And at least in countries where there is a history of coups, politicians are also equally wary of annoying their military upper ranks for a similar reason.

So why not the little guys? Well, because they could never do it. The usual ranking soldier is underpaid, if paid at all. They’re often undertrained, and couldn’t mobilize the resources or strategy to get the job done. (Having said this, the little guys do often go along with a coup once it’s happening … nothing like the sense that your paycheck or next meal is moving to make you want to follow it.)

So the middle guy is the one left. They’re paid better than some, but not good enough for most. Like the coup leader in Niger, they’ve often had foreign training. They control strategic components of the miltiary — in Guinea’s case, the petrol procurement, and in Niger’s case, a platoon in the capital. They know enough people to mobilize the ranks, but they are not as politically tainted. They’re well connected but not appointees; they’ve often just risen through the ranks.

There’s one other key detail in all this: those paychecks. As happens in many salary structures  in West African countries (not just militaries), each person who pays a subordinate takes a cut out of their paycheck as a “fee.” (Read: skimming off the top.) The foot soldiers get their pay skimmed by the lieutenants; the lieutenants get theirs skimmed by their superiors, and on and on it goes. Bad as this is for the low-level guys, it really bites for the mid-level people, whose salaries are picked at by their powerful superiors above. They’re managing, they’re doing serious work … and they’re not getting paid. They have a taste of power but not enough fiscal incentives not to rock the boat.

Lo and behold, you get a coup. A well trained, well connected, underpaid, and generally disgruntled middle man is your suspect — guilty as charged.

Source: Foreign Policy.

 

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