Tag: Chad

China’s Wang Yi Africa Visit: 2025 Will Be A Fruitful Year For Sino-Africa Relations

Posted on by Allawi Ssemanda

Dear Editor, last week, China’s top Diplomat Wang Yi completed his week-long Africa trip having visited four different African countries of Chad, the Republic of Congo, Namibia and Nigeria.

The visit which marked 140th visit from Chinese top leadership to the continent since the year 2007. It was also 35th year in a row Chinese Foreign Minister making Africa the first destination for his foreign where traditionally the visit covers 4-5 African countries every January of the year. By all measures, the tradition confirms that China puts great importance to its cooperation with Africa. It is also a testament that China’s diplomatic ties with Africa is guided by principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, inclusiveness and real results as President Xi Jinping often states.

Wang Yi’s visit came just months after China upgraded bilateral relations between African countries with China to the level of strategic relations, with president Xi Jinping during 2024 Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) announcing that the overall characterization of Africa-China relations be elevated to all-weather China-Africa community with a shared future for the new era.

If critically analyzed, Wang Yi, who doubles as a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, his visit is key in deepening practical cooperation between China and Africa in different sectors and promoting an in-depth development of China-Africa cooperation with real results and win-win for both sides. Indeed, President Xi Jinping observed in his 2013 FOCAC summit key note address in Durban, South Africa that; “the development of China-Africa ties can only be in the present continuous tense and never in the present perfect tense.”  A decade plus since Xi’s remarks, China continues to stand shoulder to shoulder and work with African countries for mutual benefits – a sign that Beijing is committed to her idea of building a community of shared future and prosperity for mankind in the new era.

For decades now, the trade between two sides have been growing and are projected to further grow in 2025. For example, in addition to being Africa’s largest trading partner for the last 15 years in a row, at the end of 2023, China’s trade volume with African countries reached USD 282.1 billion. At the end of 2024, this grew to USD 296 billion representing about 5% increasement, according to data by the General Administration of Customs of China.

With China’s Belt and Road Initiative which is making significant contribution in improving the continent’s infrastructure connectivity, zero tariff policy on African goods entering Chinese markets as announced by China, the figures of trade between two sides will likely grow further. Considering multiplier effects of such which include among others contributing to improved standards of living, one can safely argue that China-Africa cooperation in all ways is contributing to building a community of shared prosperity and shared future in the new era. This goes without saying that China’s initiatives such as Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiatives are also key in building the ideal world.

In this context, Wang Yi’s visit clearly shows China’s willingness to work with African counterparts in ensuring that the 10 partnership actions President Xi announced during the 2024 FOCAC summit meant to be implemented over a period of next three years are fast tracked. The 10 Partnership Actions include among others; mutual learning among civilization which will see sharing of governance experience, establishment of 25 China-Africa studies centers; the Partnership Action for trade and prosperity; the Partnership Action for industrial chain cooperation which will see the launch of an African SMEs empowerment program and  China supporting the continent to build 20 digital demonstration projects in Africa; the Partnership Action of connectivity with aim of supporting 30 infrastructure connectivity projects in Africa; and Partnership Action on health. Under health action, China will send 2,000 medical experts in Africa, launch 20 programs of health facilities and malaria treatment and encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa’s pharmaceutical production.

Others include Partnership Action for development cooperation which will see implementation of 1,000 small and beautiful livelihood projects; Partnership Action for agriculture and livelihoods which will see increase in Chinese funding of agriculture on the continent; Partnership Action for green development; Partnership Action for people-to-people exchanges; and Partnership Action for common security.

If critically analyzed, all the 10 Partnership Actions will help the continent to address its challenges and most of its bottlenecks to development. For example, under the Partnership Action for Agriculture and livelihoods, China promised to provide Africa with 1 billion Chinese Yuan in emergency food assistance, support in building about 6,670 hectares of standardized agricultural demonstration, send agricultural experts to train their African counterparts and establish a China-Africa agricultural science and technology innovation alliance. This is in addition to implementing 500 programs meant to support and promote community welfare. More importantly, under the Partnership Action for agriculture, China’s aim is to promote two-way investments for new business by both Chinese and African companies with aim of retaining and adding value in goods produced on the continent and create at least one million jobs for the continent.

Aware that China believes in consultations other than enforcing her own ideas on her allies, one can argue that Wang Yi’s visit at a time when the two sides are readying themselves to embark on implementation of the projects under the said Partnership Actions, the visit was crucial for consultations and understanding of priorities for African countries where the partnership projects will be implemented. It is also a testament of China’s readiness and willingness to kick-start the implementation of the 10 partnership actions.

Taking the Partnership Action for common security as an example, during his Africa trip, Minister Yi was categorical that China will “firmly support Africans in addressing African issues in the African way,” stressing that “African people are the real masters of this continent.” Yi further expressed China’s stance against interfering in the Continent’s internal affairs in any form and instead showed Beijing’s willingness and readiness to support the continent so that African countries themselves can devise ways of addressing their concerns. It’s in this visit that wang announced USD 136 million to support the continent in addressing security issues, help in training of 6000 troops and 1,000 police officers across Africa. He also pledged China’s support to the continent in its interests including at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). “At the UNSC, China will always be in favor of Africa,” stressed wang Yi.

In conclusion, considering that China takes engagement and consultations with allies key in their development support; and, aware that China’s global initiatives such as Global Development Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative and Global Security Initiative and the Belt and Road Initiative have some convergence with African Union’s Agenda 2063, one can safely argue that 2025 will be a fruitful year for China-Africa cooperation. With Wang Yi’s just concluded visit, this assertion is arguably bankable especially that both sides are determined to strengthen their achievements and that Beijing has been clear that her relationship with Africa is guided by principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefits and real results with aim of building a community of shared future for mankind in the new era.

The writer is a resident senior research fellow at the Development watch Centre.

China’s Wang Yi’s Africa Visit Shows Her Value

Posted on by Joshua Kingdom

By Joshua Kingdom

“Africa should be a big stage for international cooperation, not an arena for major-force rivalry”. These were the words of then Chinese Foreign Minister (FM) Qin Gang speaking to the press in Ethiopia while on his Africa visit in January 2023. Thereafter, he would fly to Angola, Gabon, Benin, and finally Egypt. This sort of thing happens at every beginning of year in a long standing tradition of demonstrating an enduring commitment to African affairs by The Chinese Communist party (CCP). For 2025, the current FM, Wang Yi concluded the year’s version of the tour in Nigeria on Thursday last week.

There is a lot that the minister’s journey achieved on its own, including the fact that his meeting with President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo re-echoed China’s readiness to start on the implementation of her promises at last year’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation as well as how the liaison with Chad fills a gap that the recent crisis between the country and her former colonizer had caused. For our purposes here however, we will instead focus on how it is that the custom of Chinese foreign ministers travelling to this part of the world annually is strong evidence for how much their government cherishes it.

In doing so, I hope to provide a counter-perspective to that which one often hears from the West when its media paints China’s motives in relating with Africa as opportunistic through and through. As you read on, please keep at the back of your mind the fact that these cries have somehow become louder at a time when the potential of the AU states begins to vividly show– it is estimated for instance, that we will spend as much as $16 trillion in consumption and business yearly by 2050.

The shift in partnership preference by African leaders from West to East is explainable in part by the fact that Beijing has treated them with dignity. While President Hu Jintao hosted the first China-Africa Summit in 2006 thus, it took almost a decade before the United States thought that organizing an equivalent event was worth the bother. No example brings out this point better however, than the FMs’ engagements. I mean, the practice has been going for thirty-five years now. Surely, everyone would agree that the state of geopolitics has changed so much from 1990 that China cannot have been lying low all this while waiting for when the moment is right. Add to this the fact that FMs are often high ranking state officials such that their involvement in any duty is a mark of the significance that their party attaches to it and you see where this is going. Indeed, Wang Yi presently serves on the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Moreover, China has made gains from the China-Africa FM trips as much as Africa has. Seeing the deliberate effort that the CCP leadership has invested through this initiative, other global powers are beginning to send more of their top politicians on the continent with competing offers. In 2023 alone hence, United States Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited five African nations between themselves. And in December last year, President Biden made his way to Angola. Significantly, the latter country has a lot to thank China for since western powers had mostly abandoned it during the immediate aftermath of the disastrous war that wrecked it at the turn of the century.

Knowing that there is no place in which actions speak louder than words than in foreign relations then, the time that Chinese FMs spend on the continent every beginning of year tells us all that we need to know about their homeland’s view of Africa. Countries in the Northern hemisphere will have to up the game before earning the right to convince Africans otherwise.

The writer is a lawyer and research fellow at the Development Watch Centre.

Civil-Military Imbalance in the Sahel

Posted on by Admin

By Nina Wilén

In less than a year, the Sahel region has experienced two coups, one coup attempt and something that now looks like a ‘coup within a coup’, firmly putting civil-military relations at the top of the agenda for understanding the current context of power competition between political and military elites.

In democratic states, the imperative to ‘guard the guardians’ is the basis for civil-military relations. Civilian decision-makers are accountable to the people while military officers have a responsibility to abide by the civilians, and to advise, yet not impose, their views on those civilians. That is the basis of democratic theory, which has been institutionalized and taught to militaries across the world. A theory which nonetheless increasingly has been put to test in industrialized democracies over the past few years.

In fragile democracies, such as Mali, Niger and Chad, where the societal unity and administrative ability to maintain a functioning state are lacking, and where armed groups entertain a violent status quo, calls for security and stability give the security forces a central role. This central role is strengthened by security force assistance from external partners, which train and equip the armed forces to combat violent non-state actors in an effort to reinforce state authority. While the premises of civilian oversight and accountability most often are part of such training, such principles have little resonation in a context where state officials are incapable or unwilling of providing a democratic framework to implement oversight and promote accountability, or when it is de facto military rule.

In all three states which have experienced coups and coup attempts over the past year, the military has historically been closely intertwined with politics. Niger, which experienced a feeble coup attempt following the Presidential elections earlier this year, has a history of three coups over the past three decades. The country has spent 22 years of its 60 years as an independent state under military rule, giving an indication of the military’s influence in domestic politics. Yet, the fact that the past two coups (in 1999 and 2010), were so-called ‘corrective coups’ – meaning that the coup makers handed over power to democratically elected leaders relatively soon after the putsches – in combination with a relatively low number of human rights abuses by the Nigerien armed forces in comparison to its regional homologues, has given the Nigerien security forces a slightly better reputation than their neighboring colleagues. That reputation is however vanishing quickly, as reports of mass executions by Nigerien army units surfaced in 2020.
In Chad, a state where “politics is conducted with weapons in hand”, the military has maintained a key role in a history of rebellions and suppressions under a ‘warrior president’ firmly supported by its former colonial power France. The late Idriss Déby, who stayed in power over three decades, was by all accounts an excellent strategist who managed to make sure that the Chadian military became a regional and international tool in the fight against terrorists and criminal networks. He thereby avoided repercussions for a deeply personalized dictatorship and multiple human rights abuses conducted against civilians, both home and abroad.

Chadian forces contribute most troops to the UN mission in Mali, often deployed to the most dangerous places in the North, whereas they are in the lead for the G5 Sahel Joint Force for counter-terrorism and a valuable support to France in Barkhane. Fighting against Boko Haram in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTJF), Chad has also acquired support from other Western powers, thus rendering itself an essential ally and a strategic asset in the Sahel. Not surprisingly therefore, the recent unconstitutional move, whereby Déby’s son Mahamat Déby bypassed the constitution and took the lead of a Transitional Military Council following his father’s death at the hands of rebels in April this year, did not face any regional or international repercussions, but rather support for status quo. Mahamat’s lightning career development as a 37-year old four-star general also reflects the heavy politicization of the military and personalization of the state. It does not seem far-fetched to view Chad as an example of a ‘garrison state’, where the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society. Overall, the civil-military balance is not just superficial in Chad, it is illusionary.

Mali, which has been the epicenter of the overlapping Sahelian crises over the past decade, has experienced one coup and what looks like a ‘coup within a coup’, within 9 months. These coups can be added to the earlier three in 1968, 1991 and 2012, the latter which prompted a heavy international response. Such a history of coups suggests a significant militarization of politics, where military members remain central political figures even during periods of civilian rule. The international focus on establishing security and stability has inevitably reinforced the local security forces’ standing in Mali, in spite of their poor reputation, as they remain the primary tool through which such stability is to be achieved. Recent decades’ emphasis on the security-development nexus has also prompted a securitization of underdevelopment and poverty by recipient states, such as Mali, in the interest of attracting external security assistance.

The past year’s military coups in the Sahel have thus underlined the profound imbalance in civil-military relations in the region and raised questions regarding security force assistance to fragile states more broadly. These questions are particularly timely as the EU is set to launch its much-debated European Peace Facility, an off-budget financial instrument which will allow EU to fund military training, equipment, and infrastructure in partner countries for the first time in history. There is clearly a case to be made against providing lethal equipment to, and improving the capacity of, security forces which recently have been involved in military coups and human rights abuses. There is also an important difference in the type of training and equipment that is delivered. Providing first-aid kits and training troops in judicialization does not entail the same consequences as contributing with weapons and improving armed forces’ combat efficiency.

Yet, in spite of the ethical dilemmas related to security force assistance, not providing any training at all is not an easy solution, as although it decreases external partners’ responsibility for local forces’ transgressions, it also removes any possible leverage they may exert on the local militaries. Critics may claim that whatever influence external partners have had so far, it clearly has not been sufficient to prevent forces from conducting coups or even to limit abuse against the civilian populations. However, it is also possible to imagine that the situation would have been different without external training and assistance, leaving more space for non-state armed actors to commit attacks and even less control over local forces’ behavior. Western states are also uneasy about leaving a gap when it comes to security assistance, as there is a risk that it is filled by other actors such as Russia or China who are keen to have an influence in the region, and who have less scruples regarding democratic norms and civil-military balance.

The recent coups in the Sahel region exemplify the lack of a civil-military balance whereby the armed forces are both under substantial civilian oversight and capable of national defense. Fragile and divided states which fail to deliver basic services to their populations, are by their very nature more prone to instability and coups. In a crisis context where security and stabilization become priorities, the armed forces are likely to further strengthen their upper hand, especially with external support. International and national authorities which demand military expertise to fight armed groups and strengthen national security ‘pull’ the armed forces further into politics, while the latter exploit their advantage over civilian authorities to ‘push’ their way into politics. Building on a history whereby the military has consistently been heavily involved in politics, the current context in the Sahel evokes Finer’s classical civil-military question: Why is military intervention in politics or military government the exception, rather than the rule? The present answer to that question may unfortunately be that right now, it is more of a rule than an exception.

Dr. Nina Wilén, is a Global Fellow at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO).

The views expressed in the this article are his own and not necessarily those of DWC.