Belgium earmarks 4 million Euro on Coronavirus vaccines for Developing Countries.

By Allawi Ssemanda.

Belgium has announced four million euro (about 17,843,735,168.00 Ugx) for COVAX program. COVAX is a global initiative that brings together governments and pharmaceutical companies with aim of ensuring that Covid-19 vaccines are available and accessible to all those in need especially in developing countries.

Presently, all approved and available vaccines have been booked and purchased by richer countries for their internal needs leaving out many developing countries.

But in the meantime, everyone knows that COVID does not stop at our borders. We will only be completely safe if all the countries in the world are safe. That’s why this international solidarity is so much needed now,…Our country must continue to play a pioneering role in this endeavour,” Meryme Kitir,  the Minister of Development Cooperation told journalists today.

Under COVAX initiative, developed countries have already secured 2 billion doses which will be released in 2021 to 92 developing countries and several humanitarian organizations. Kitir added that the world can only defeat covid-19 pandemic through international cooperation. “International solidarity is the only answer to stop COVID-19. COVAX is the multilateral initiative that will also give the poorest countries access to the vaccine. Our contribution – 4 million euros in 2021 – is not only a well-considered contribution, but also a substantial one. It is a powerful signal, taking into account our carrying capacity. This is the essence of international solidaritysaid Minister Kitir.

Belgium is a member of Team Europe, a group that has supported several developing countries to counter Covid-19. In June 2020, Team Europe announced 737 billion to help Uganda in mitigating impact of Covid-19.

China has promised millions of coronavirus vaccines to countries globally. And it is ready to deliver them.

By David Culver and Nectar Gan.

Inside a gray warehouse at the Shenzhen International Airport in southern China, a row of white chambers sits in a cordoned-off corner, each fitted with a display screen showing the customised temperature inside.

A security worker in face mask, surgical gown and rubber gloves stands guard. Anyone entering this part of the warehouse has to either complete two weeks of quarantine or wear a head-to-toe hazmat suit.

These climate-controlled rooms, totalling an area of 350 square meters (3,767 square feet), are soon to be filled by rows and rows of Chinese-made Covid-19 vaccines — after they receive approval from the country’s drug regulators. From there, they’ll be loaded onto temperature-controlled compartments of cargo jets and flown to continents around the world.

The climate-controlled chambers at Shenzhen’s international airport will soon be filled with Chinese-made coronavirus vaccines.

In the coming months, China will be sending hundreds of millions of doses of coronavirus vaccines to countries that have conducted last-stage trials for its leading candidates. Chinese leaders have also promised a growing list of developing countries priority access to its successful vaccines.

The climate-controlled chambers at Shenzhen’s international airport will soon be filled with Chinese-made coronavirus vaccines. Courtesy Photo

 Article Source CNN

Sickening thy neighbour: Export restraints on medical supplies during a pandemic

By Simon Evenett

Given the centrality of China to many international supply chains, there is considerable interest in the impact of COVID-19 on global trade flows. And a troubling trade policy dimension is now coming to light. This column reports on and assesses a finding of the Global Trade Alert that 24 nations have recently imposed export restrictions on medical supplies.

In our interconnected world, whenever a global crisis occurs governments must decide whether discriminating against foreign suppliers is part of the solution, or whether foreign knowhow and resources can be tapped for mutual advantage. Decisions to sacrifice open borders on the altar of some other goal are typically influenced by the steps – real or perceived – taken by other governments. At such times, written and unwritten international rules are tested, with consequences that can last well after the crisis dominated headlines. The coronavirus pandemic is no exception.

Given the centrality of China to many international supply chains, there is considerable interest in the impact of the COVID-19 on global trade flows (Baldwin and Tomiura 2020) and on the value and location of foreign direct investment (UNCTAD 2020). However, there is a troubling trade policy dimension that is now coming to light. To appreciate its significance, recall that the Director-General of the World Health Organization has argued that “[w]e can’t stop COVID-19 without protecting health workers” (WHO 2020). Those workers require gloves, medical masks, respirators, face shields, gowns and the like. And as the Coronavirus has spread, glaring shortages have arisen. Consequently, WHO has called on governments to increase production of protective equipment by 40% and to roll back export restrictions.

Drawing upon a recent analysis by the Global Trade Alert (2020), in this column I assess one of the key findings, namely, that a growing number of governments have been sickening their trading partners by banning or limiting the export of medical supplies. Here medical supplies are taken to mean protective medical equipment (such as masks) as well as medicines and their ingredients.

Resort to export restrictions since the beginning of this year

It is important to appreciate that governments can restrict exports of medical supplies in many ways. Not all of them are as salient as a publicised export ban. For example, a government can decree that all relevant medical equipment supplies produced in a country must be sold to the state, which in turn decides not to make any product available to foreign buyers. Governments can also tinker with intellectual property rights legislation, effectively frustrating the sale of a medicine abroad. Ministers may threaten local medical suppliers if they ship goods abroad. Lastly, governments may insist that a local supplier ship a maximum percentage of its production abroad or require tedious paperwork to be filled before approval to export is given. All of these means – some more transparent than others – have been deployed by governments since the beginning of the year.

That these export restrictions are biting is now evident. In early March 2020, the German authorities stopped delivery of 240,000 masks to a Swiss buyer, prompting the government in Bern to carpet the German Ambassador (NZZ 2020). In addition, a French requisition order has prevented Valmy SAS from fulfilling a contract with the British National Health Service to supply millions of masks (Euronews 2020). Similarly, North American buyers of Chinese medical supplies report that orders were not fulfilled once the coronavirus began to spread (CNN Business 2020).

Sorting through press reports, it was possible to identify 24 nations that have imposed either a formal export ban, a de facto export ban, or an export limit on some form of coronavirus-related medical supply. Figure 1 reveals the identities of those nations. That no export restrictions have been found in North America, one in South America, and relatively few in Africa suggests that at this time, distance from China may be a contributing factor.

The pace at which governments are resorting to export restrictions is accelerating. Of the 27 instances of export restrictions imposed by these 24 nations since the beginning of the year, 16 were implemented in the first ten days of March 2020.

Completeness requires acknowledging that India has reversed some of its export restrictions on masks in early February, allowing some to be exported to China. Turning over a new leaf this was not – New Delhi followed up later in the month by banning the export of 26 pharmaceutical ingredients and some of the products made with them, such as paracetamol. Also, very recently Taiwan temporarily lifted an export ban on facial markets. Still, overall, export policy became more restrictive.

Five adverse consequences of limiting exports of medical supplies

The last time export restraints were the focus of much economic research was after many government limited food exports during the commodity price spikes of 2006-8 (e.g. Anderson and Jensen 2017). In that case, export limits were found to raise the level and volatility of world prices while doing little to depress domestic prices, which were driven in part by other factors. As means of ensuring food security, such export limits were of dubious value.

The parallels to recent export bans on medical supplies are inexact. In the present case, the nub of the matter is availability rather than price. Health professionals are in the front line in the fight again the Coronavirus and to reduce the risk of themselves getting sick – or to delay the moment when that happens – they need protective medical kit. Export bans on masks, for example, erode the capability of trading partners to cope with the spread of the coronavirus. Rather than beggar-thy-neighbour, this amounts to sicken-thy-neighbour.

Denying foreign buyers medical suppliers is costly for the imposing nation too for four reasons. First, recall that the purpose of such export limits is to increase the supply available to local hospitals, etc. Whatever temporary gain there is in limiting shipments abroad, the loss of future export sales will discourage local firms from ramping up production and investing in new capacity, which is exactly what WHO has called for. In practical terms, this means that during a pandemic an export ban ‘secures’ certain currently available domestic medical supplies at the expense of future locally produced supplies.

Second, the fiscal inducements that governments will have to deploy to persuade domestic firms to expand production will have to be larger in the presence of an export ban. What may sound like an expedient policy response to a health pandemic actually increases the burden on the public finances at exactly the wrong time.

Third, export bans jeopardise cooperation with other governments. Erosion of trust between trading nations need not be confined to medical supplies and cooperation on health matters. Plus retaliation by harmed trading partners cannot be ruled out – the extensive supply chains in medicines and medical equipment imply that pretty much every nation is vulnerable to some forms of retaliation.

Fourth, one nation’s export ban is a political gift to nationalists and populists in affected trading partners. Calls for protectionist industrial policies are the result – as demonstrated by the recent remarks of Mr. Peter Navarro, the Director of President Trump’s Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (Financial Times 2020) – implying that the nation that imposes an export ban may find that conditions of competition abroad have worsened well after the coronavirus pandemic has been tackled.

Less-damaging policy alternatives exist

Proposals for export limits should be tested against alternatives that do not impede foreign purchases. Governments concerned that subsidising domestic production will benefit disproportionately foreign buyers should consider setting price floors for medical devices sold to the state. Such minimum prices could apply to a pre-announced limit of government purchases. Local producers would then be assured of a guaranteed amount of revenue for supplying the state with critical medical supplies.

Where practical, consumption subsidies should be considered as well. If there are concerns that minimum prices or subsidies cannot be afforded by some developing countries, then the World Bank and IMF should stand ready to advance the sums necessary. What matters is that production of critical medical supplies is stimulated globally and that trade policy facilitates their expeditious distribution.

Source: Vox EU

 

How The Indiscriminate Virus Reinforced Our Inequalities And The Lessons We Can Draw From This When It Is All Over.

By Nina Wilén .

The Corona pandemic is changing the way we live and function as a society for at least the coming weeks or months. While it is a virus that does not take into account race, sex, class or age, it is quite brutally revealing and reinforcing socio-economic inequalities which reflect the distribution of power in our societies. This, at the same time as it is showing us the strength of empathy, respect and solidarity, in a time where individualism long has been the guiding principle. In this commentary, I reflect on the long-term consequences of the Corona virus for different groups in society and identify some lessons to be learned from this pandemic: 1) technology is only a means of communication, not a replacement for human socialization; 2) the importance of the people delivering the state’s basic services in the education, security and health care sectors, needs to be acknowledged in both respect, and better working conditions, and lastly: 3) our interconnectedness is both a weakness and a strength, with solidarity coming out as the main lesson learned from this crisis.

At the start of the spread of the Corona virus, I was surely not alone in selfishly thinking that it was something far away from my continent, from my country and from my city, and thus something to watch and comment on, from a safe distance. Only a few weeks later, however, it had entered Europe and its far-reaching consequences became evident for everyone as we watched Italy struggle to cope with the spread of the virus. Yet, even though, we all, most likely, eventually will be exposed to the virus, the consequences are clearly not the same for everyone. As all major catastrophes, this pandemic is hitting the most vulnerable the hardest and reinforcing inequality. It is however not just the most vulnerable, the ones that we can easily identify as the homeless, the chronically ill and those suffering from extreme poverty, that are disproportionately exposed to the consequences, it is also those whose vulnerability is under control and to some extent hidden as long as society is functioning as usual. They are the ones I will focus on below.

We already know that this is a virus that hits the elderly and the chronically ill harder than the rest. “Just as the seasonal flu,” some will point out, which is true. Yet, in comparison to all the things we do not know, what we do know is that it is far more deadly than the ordinary flu and we therefore need extraordinary measures like confinement and social distancing to slow down its pace. The elderly, our parents and grandparents, are thus the primary group at risk, a group which both is more accustomed to less interaction with others, due to their retirement from the work force, but at the same time more in need of other social activities to replace that human interaction. While all our elderly relatives are not dedicated members to yoga clubs, bridge parties or volunteering for a variety of good causes, many are dependent on this type of social interaction to avoid feeling isolated. Many are also living alone, with limited capacities to use internet to keep in touch, and with the advice to avoid meeting younger children and grand-children during the coming weeks, loneliness may become a far bigger health threat than the Corona virus to this group of people.

Children are not the main risk group of getting serious infections from the Corona virus, although they remain, as always, small, and sometimes cute and innocent, transmitters. No parent has ever doubted this during the autumn season’s range of colds, flus and sore throats. Yet, while children are not facing the worst health risks, they are still affected by the social  distancing and the closure of schools. Those children with parents who are privileged enough to be able to stay at home and who have the capacity, and will to home school (I am already starting to doubt the two latter for myself), will come back to school, many steps ahead of those whose parents cannot or will not do the same.

For the children who live with parents and relatives cramped in small apartments, home schooling is difficult even if there are adults able and willing to teach, for the simple reasons of lack of space and concentration. For many children who have parents with drug, or abuse problems, home schooling is not even an option. For them, school is a sanctuary where social contact with other adults and children is a relief. For them, the confinement will have more consequences than just an involuntary break in their education. So, children are not, as we would like to think, all spared from the consequences of this pandemic.

The last few weeks have seen enormous numbers of workers fired or put on temporary “technical unemployment” from a variety of different jobs: factory workers, cultural workers and flight personnel to name just a few. This is not including all of the small business owners of restaurants, gyms and cafés, who will face significant economic consequences with the isolation and social distancing. Even states which hardly can be considered as well-fare states are creating massive economic support packages to counter for these economic consequences. Yet, no support package can substitute the feeling of being replaceable. The social consequences will thus most likely be as far-reaching as the economic ones and spilling over into the private sphere as well.

Women are disproportionately responsible for caring for both children and the elderly, both in the public workforce and in the private sphere. As such, they will carry a heavier load than the men when it comes to home schooling and remaining in touch with elderly relatives. This will also disproportionately affect women’s careers. Anyone who has ever tried working from home with younger children, knows that the productivity and efficiency are likely to hit rock bottom fairly quick, resulting in less career advancement, while single mothers who cannot work from home are faced with an unenviable dilemma. Women are also disproportionately affected by domestic violence, which has been known to increase during periods of economic hardship. In February, the number of domestic violence cases nearly tripled in the Hubei province after the quarantine in January. Again, the social consequences will at times be harder to remedy than the economic. This is why it is important to turn the social consequences into lessons learned from this crisis.

What have we learned from the crisis?

The Corona crisis has made our reliance on technology glaringly obvious in the past few weeks, but so has our need for human interaction, beyond the virtual sphere. While technology can do a lot for us these days and the appreciation for Skype, Face Time and WhatsApp grows as it makes it possible for us to stay in touch with our loved ones across borders and in the midst of a pandemic, we have also come to realise that technology does not replace human contact.

Source: Read this full article on Egmont.

 

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